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Abstract—From its early days the Internet of Things (IoT)
has evolved into a decentralized system of cooperating smart
objects with the requirement, among others, of achieving
distributed consensus. Yet, current IoT platform solutions are
centralized cloud based computing infrastructures, manifest-
ing a number of significant disadvantages, such as, among
others, high cloud server maintenance costs, weakness for
supporting time-critical IoT applications, security and trust
issues. Enabling blockchain technology into IoT can help to
achieve a proper distributed consensus based IoT system that
overcomes those disadvantages. While this is an ideal match,
it is still a challenging endeavor. In this paper we take a first
step towards that goal by designing Hybrid-IoT, a hybrid
blockchain architecture for IoT. In Hybrid-IoT, subgroups
of IoT devices form PoW blockchains, referred to as PoW
sub-blockchains. Then, the connection among the PoW sub-
blockchains employs a BFT inter-connector framework, such
as Polkadot or Cosmos. In this paper, we focus on the PoW
sub-blockchains formation, guided by a set of guidelines based
on a set of dimensions, metrics and bounds. In order to prove
the validity of the approach we carry on a performance and
security evaluation.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT), architec-
ture, distributed consensus, Proof of Work (PoW).
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) technology is heterogeneously
applied to several environments: buildings, automotive, man-
ufacturing, cities, etc., with the potential to make them
smarter, more connected, profitable, and efficient. This typi-
cally requires the connection, concerted operation and man-
agement of a distributed large number of loosely coupled
smart devices [1], that need to identify and trust each other.
While this should ideally map to a decentralized hardware
and software platform, current solutions are mostly based
on centralized infrastructures. The disadvantages of that are,
among others: high maintenance costs; low interoperability
due to restricted data aggregation with other centralized in-
frastructures; single point of failures (SPOF) against security
threats.
Decentralization, if achieved, would have the advantage
to reduce the amount of data that are transferred to the
cloud for processing and analysis, it would be instrumental
to improve security and privacy of the managed data [2], and
it would lead to concerted and autonomous operations. For
example, in smart home environments [3], IoT devices have
to autonomously exchange and process data, assure data
security, operations accountability, device identification and,
last but not least, to collectively and autonomously execute
smart homes operations. This, from a distributed systems
point of view, means achieving distributed consensus.
A promising decentralized platform for IoT is block-
chain. Blockchain is the concept of a distributed ledger
maintained by a peer-to-peer network. Its data structure
consists of bundled data chunks called blocks, where peers
in a blockchain broadcast blocks by exploiting public-key
cryptography. Blocks are recorded in the blockchain with
exact ordering. Briefly, a block contains: a set of transac-
tions (exchange and transfer of information); a timestamp;
a reference to the preceding block that identifies the block’s
place in the blockchain; an authenticated data structure
(e.g., a merkle tree [4]) to ensure block integrity.1 Modern
blockchain protocols, such as Ethereum2, possess scripting
systems that allow the coding and execution of computing
programs on the blockchain itself, referred to as smart
contracts [5]. Different blockchain protocols may employ
different methodologies to achieve consensus. For example,
some blockchains use Proof of Work (PoW) [6], while others
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) [7]. In PoW blockchains,
peers, referred to as block miners, have to use their hardware
resources and energy to solve a cryptographic puzzle as
proof of their work, in order to be authorized to generate a
new block. Notably, PoW blockchains are able to maintain
a relative low throughput while scaling to thousands of
nodes in achieving consensus, while BFT blockchains can
maintain a relative high throughput with only few nodes.
Other consensus protocols are emerging, for example Proof
Of Stake (PoS) [5], but for the scope of this work we
consider mature and well implemented protocols like PoW
and BFT.
When it comes to IoT, blockchain can be used to store
critical machine-to-machine communications, sent as block-
chain transactions, ensuring accountability and security of
1Block structure varies in different blockchain protocols, here we list
the most common elements.
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the stored data. It can also provide identity and proof of
provenance of IoT devices with its cryptographic functions.
While the literature offers some examples of blockchain
technology in IoT, such as [8], [9], [10], up to now there is
no de facto standard solution.
Indeed, one of the biggest challenges in the integration
of blockchain into IoT is scalability. In fact, due to the mas-
sive number of devices and resource constraints, deploying
blockchain in IoT is particularly challenging. The optimal
blockchain architecture has to scale to many IoT devices
(they become the peers on the blockchain network), and it
should be able to process a high throughput of transactions.
Hybrid-IoT, the platform designed in this work, exploits
both PoW blockchains and BFT protocols. First, PoW block-
chains are used to achieve distributed consensus among
many IoT devices, the peers on the blockchain. To measure
and qualify that, we define a set of PoW blockchain-IoT
integration metrics, and we evaluate the performance of
Hybrid-IoT subject to varying blockchain block sizes and
block generation intervals, device locations, and number of
peers. Since we first observed that PoW blockchains contain-
ing few hundreds of geographically close IoT devices have
high performance (i.e., high transaction throughputs) and
low block propagation delays, the first step in Hybrid-IoT
consists of generating multiple PoW blockchains. Those are
generated according to a set of rules, referred to as sweet-
spot guidelines, that combine best practices in designing
sub-blockchains. As a second step, Hybrid-IoT leverages on
a BFT inter-connector framework ,such as Polkadot3 and
Cosmos,4 in order to achieve interoperability among sub-
blockchains. In this work, we only deal with the first step,
that is, analyzing the performance and security of the PoW
sub-blockchain setting.
Furthermore, in Hybrid-IoT we define three roles for
IoT devices according to their capabilities, and test the
performance of the system with a set of experiments and
simulations. Moreover, we extensively test security of our
approach by acknowledging that generating sub-blockchains
may generate security vulnerabilities.
We stress that, in this work, we make extensive use
of Bitcoin clients and a Bitcoin simulator to conduct the
performance analysis. The Bitcoin client approach is used to
test the Hybrid-IoT architecture and design. The real focus
here is the PoW sub-blockchains design with the sweet-spot
guidelines and the type of tests and analysis performed here
would not differ with other types of PoW protocols that
allow smart contracts (this would affect only the types of
transactions submitted to the peers).
In the literature, there are few papers targeting ap-
plication of blockchain to IoT (cfr. Section 2). However,
application of blockchain to IoT has been mainly limited to
application specific tasks (e.g. firmware updates of IoT de-
vices [10]), whereas the goal of this paper is to decentralize
IoT by exploiting blockchain.
Contributions. Our main contributions are:
3polkadot.network
4cosmos.network
? A set of PoW blockchain-IoT integration metrics to
measure performance.
? A measurement study of the performance of PoW
blockchains in IoT.
? A hybrid blockchain architecture for IoT.
Structure. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work. We de-
fine PoW blockchain-IoT integration metrics in Section 3.
In Section 4, we extensively evaluate PoW blockchain-
IoT integration and define sweet-spot guidelines for sub-
blockchain generation. We detail the design of Hybrid-IoT
in Section 5. In Section 6, we evaluate performance of the
sub-blockchains. Security of our approach is discussed in
Section 7, whereas Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In the literature, there are few instances of application
of blockchain to IoT. One application of blockchain to IoT
is [8], where a blockchain platform for industrial IoT (BPI-
IoT) has been proposed. BPIIoT exploits smart contracts
to develop a decentralized manufacturing applications of
cloud based manufacturing (CBM). Smart contracts have
also been exploited in [9] in order to manage smart meter
data. Likewise, in [10] a blockchain based system has been
proposed to manage firmware updates of IoT devices. [11]
exploits blockchain to store access control data, as a data
storage system in a multi-tier IoT architecture. In [12],
blockchain and smart contracts are used to secure authoriza-
tion requests to IoT resources. The above mentioned works
make use of blockchain to either execute smart contracts or
perform application specific tasks, but not to decentralize
IoT systems and achieve autonomous application execution.
[13] proposes a blockchain architecture for IoT con-
taining two layers, namely: smart home layer (centrally
managed private ledgers) and a overlay layer (public block-
chain). Resource constrained devices form private ledgers
in smart home layer, that are centrally managed by con-
stituent nodes. Group of constituent nodes select a cluster
head operating in the overlay network. On one hand, this
proposal has some similarities with Hybrid-IoT as it includes
multiple blockchains. It relies on distributed trust algorithms
to eliminate computational overhead from IoT devices due to
PoW solving task. However, the proposed architecture does
not help with the decentralization of IoT. In fact, IoT devices
are centrally managed and connected to one constituent node
that does not take part in the distributed consensus.
Differently from previous works, the Tangle5 protocol
implements a global distributed ledger for IoT by using
Directed Acyclic Graph generated by transactions as a
blockchainless approach. Tangle is designed as a cryptocur-
rency for IoT to make micro-payments possible, it does not
provide an architecture or data structure to decentralize IoT
and it is not Turing complete to allow scripting and smart
contracts.
5iota.org/IOTA_Whitepaper.pdf
2
3. PoW Blockchain-IoT Integration Metrics
We identify five relevant dimensions that an optimal
blockchain PoW implementation for IoT should be sub-
ject to: scalability, security, decentralization, efficiency as
observed metrics, and network bandwidth as a controlled
parameter. In what follows, we analyze those dimensions
(see Table 1 for a summary).
Scalability. Scalability in IoT is the capacity to be
changed in size or scale in terms of number of devices,
hardware characteristics and functional and non-functional
requirements, while maintaining quality of performance. For
blockchain, this translates to have a peer to peer network that
can scale up in terms of number of peers and throughput,
as number of transactions per unit of time.
Security. Security is a critical dimension in IoT, espe-
cially considering recent large scale attacks ,like Mirai and
WannaCry.6 While in this work we do not deal with device
intrusions, the issue of data integrity for IoT devices is an
important problem to be solved [14]. While data integrity
is by design preserved by a PoW blockchain, the issue of
the longer chain attack still exists [15]. In order to measure
this, we consider the maximum amount of total work in the
PoW sub-blockchain as a metric.
Decentralization. Decentralization in IoT is critical to
improve security and privacy and achieve autonomous ex-
ecution, as noted in Section 1. In peer-to-peer overlay net-
works, like blockchains, decentralization is measured by the
number of properly functioning peers [16]. In a blockchain,
a peer needs to be up to date with the most recent block
before generating a new block to be accepted by blockchain
consensus. Hence, we define the metrics for measuring
decentralization as the number of functioning peers on the
network. We also define a lower bound of functioning peers,
to be 90% of the total, to guarantee proper functionality of
the blockchain for its IoT application.
Efficiency. Efficiency in IoT can be defined as an opti-
mal utilization of hardware resources and energy. Therefore,
in order to achieve that, the IoT devices on the blockchain
should optimally utilize resources and energy to maintain
and progress the blockchain. Among others, an obstacle to
that is the issue of forks and stale blocks in PoW blockchains
[15]. Specifically, stale blocks do not contribute to the se-
curity of the blockchain and transactions in stale blocks are
considered as unprocessed by the network, requiring wasted
effort to generate them.7 Hence, we define our metrics for
efficiency as the stale block generation ratio and we establish
a upper bound for performance to be ≈1%.
Network bandwidth. Network bandwidth is a one to
one map between the IoT network and its corresponding
blockchain network. It is defined by the the IoT devices
downlink and uplink rates. For example IEEE 802.15.4 and
NarrowBand-IoT standards set 250 Kbps data transfer peak
rates for machine to machine communication, whereas in
6siliconrepublic.com/machines/iot-devices-botnets-autonomous-cars
7In Ethereum blockchain they are included to the blockchain as uncle
blocks, however they do not count towards total difficulty of the blockchain
[15].
Dimensions Metrics
Scalability  Maximum no of IoT devices as peers
 Maximum transaction throughput
Security  Maximum work in the blockchain
Decentralization  90% block propagation time
block generation interval
≤ 1
Efficiency  Stale block generation rate ≈ 1%
Network bandwidth  Avg network traffic of a device ≤ 250 Kbps
Table 1: PoW Blockchain - IoT Integration Metrics
LTE Cat M1 and LTE Cat 0 standards it is 1 Mbps. In this
work, in order to avoid network overloads and consequent
bottlenecks with high information traffic, we set an upper
bound of 250 Kbps as total of uplink and downlink rates.
4. PoW Blockchain-IoT Integration Evalua-
tions
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the inte-
gration of PoW blockchains in IoT, subject to the dimensions
and metrics defined in Section 3. To this end, we use and fur-
ther extend (by adding different device location setups) the
Bitcoin simulator8 presented in [15], (see Section 4.1). We
perform three evaluations (see Section 4.2): one by varying
block size and block generation intervals (see Section 4.2.1);
one by varying device location (see Section 4.2.2); one by
varying the number of IoT devices (see Section 4.2.3). We
present results as an average of 5 experimental runs. We use
the findings of this section to define the concept of sweet-
spot guidelines that drives the generation of sub-blockchains
(see Section 4.3).
4.1. Simulator Setting
The Bitcoin simulator is built on ns-3 discrete-event
network simulator. It allows to model a Bitcoin network
with a set of consensus and network parameters such as:
block generation interval; block size; number of nodes.
Connections between nodes are established using point-to-
point channels, by considering latency and bandwidth as
the two main characteristics (cfr. [15] for further informa-
tion). We have extended the simulator with three different
device location setups, namely the Netherlands, Europe, and
World, by adopting real world network latency data.9 In
the Netherlands setup, devices are located in six cities of
the Netherlands: Alblasserdam, Amsterdam, Dronten, Eind-
hoven, Rotterdam and The Hague. In the Europe setup,
devices are located in six European cities: Brussels, Athens,
Barcelona, Izmir, Lisbon and Milan. Finally, in the World
setup devices are located in 7 globally distributed cities:
Dhaka, Hangzhou, Istanbul, Lagos, Melbourne and San
Diego. We equally distribute regular and miner among the
cities in the respective setups.
8github.com/arthurgervais/Bitcoin-Simulator
9wondernetwork.com/pings
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In order to use the simulator for our evaluations we
categorize IoT devices within two roles: miners and regular
devices. The number of connections per miner device and
regular device follows the distribution as in [17]. Regular
devices only check and propagate the blocks they receive,
whereas miner devices also generate new blocks. The ratio
of miner over number of nodes is set to ca 7%, with the
remainder taking the role of regular devices. This is justified
by some Bitcoin statistics [17] and by the fact that we
consider only a small subset of IoT devices to have enough
resources to take part in the mining process.
Network latency plays a critical role in performance
due to the intrinsic nature of peer to peer information
propagation (i.e., block and transaction). Hence, to evaluate
how geographical locations of the devices affect network
latency, we exploit the Netherlands, Europe, and World
device location settings of the simulator.
Bandwidth capacities of IoT devices obviously affect
information propagation time in the blockchain. To have a
realistic bandwidth setup, we adopt the bandwidth bench-
marks of Raspberry Pi devices.10 Hence, we adopt an up-
per bandwidth limit of 100 Mbps (variations within that
limit are allowed due to connection type) and we realisti-
cally simulate bandwidth capacities with a distribution from
testmy.net.11 That results in a varying download bandwidth
between 0.1 Mbps and 100 Mbps with a 5 Mbps average,
and a varying upload bandwidth between 0.02 to 20 Mbps
with a 1Mbps average.
4.2. Evaluation Results
4.2.1. Evaluation I: Block sizes and block generation
intervals. We evaluate the effect of block sizes and block
generation intervals with the simulator with the Netherlands
setup. We adopt a six block generation cycle with the follow-
ing intervals: 10 minutes, 5 minutes, 1 minute, 30 seconds,
10 seconds, and 5 seconds. For every block generation cycle,
we vary block sizes as: 10 KB, 50 KB, 100 KB, 500 KB,
1 MB, 5 MB, 10 MB. We fix the number of IoT devices
to 250, with 18 devices with miner roles, according to the
7% ratio in Section 4.1. Experiment results are presented in
Table 2.
Network bandwidth. Not surprisingly, using bigger
blocks and/or having short block generation intervals in-
crease the average network traffic. In that, big blocks (e.g.,
5 MB) comply with the network bandwidth metric’s bound
when block generation interval is long enough (e.g., 5m),
whereas for small blocks (e.g., 10 KB) even short block
generation intervals (e.g., 5s) are suitable.
Security. Obviously, using shorter block generation in-
tervals increases the number of blocks generated. However,
we observe that this is not proportional, especially when the
block size is bigger than 100 KB. Similarly, in experiments
with 1 minute or shorter block generation interval settings,
increasing the block size decreases the number of generated
10pidramble.com/wiki/benchmarks/networking
11testmy.net/country
blocks. This is due to bandwidth exhaustion of devices.
Therefore, according to the bounds of security metric, using
small blocks (e.g., 10 KB) in short block generation intervals
(e.g., 5s) is more appropriate to increase number of genuine
blocks.
Decentralization. According to the decentralization
metric’s bounds, 90% block propagation time should be
lower than block generation interval. Due to their restricted
bandwidth capabilities, IoT devices have to spend more
time to propagate big blocks, and that in turn breaches the
90% block propagation time bound. In parallel, we observe
that, when using big blocks (e.g., 10 MB), block generation
interval should be long enough (e.g., 10m) to satisfy the
decentralization lower bound. For example, when small
blocks (e.g. 10 KB) are used, the decentralization bound can
be satisfied with shorter block generation intervals (e.g., 5s).
Therefore, in order to achieve decentralization, block sizes
and block generation intervals should be set carefully.
Efficiency, scalability. Short block generation intervals
and/or using big blocks leads to higher stale block rates,
as bandwidth resources of IoT devices are exhausted in
propagating the blocks. In order to achieve low stale block
rates, with a short block generation interval setup, only
small blocks can be used. Bigger blocks (e.g., 1 MB) can
be used with long block generation intervals. The bigger
the block is, the longer block generation should be used to
satisfy the low stale block generation bound. Moreover, we
observe that block sizes bigger than 1 MB are not suitable
for IoT, since it leads to high stale block rates, even with
a long block generation interval setup. Achieving a low
stale block rates positively impacts transaction throughput.
In our experiments the highest throughput achieved is 30.1
transaction per second in using 500 KB blocks with 1 minute
block generation interval setting with 1.71% stale block rate.
Findings: blocks smaller than 1 MB should be used;
block generation intervals should be as short as possible;
block size and block generation intervals should be set
carefully to ensure low stale block rates and high decen-
tralization.
4.2.2. Evaluation II: Device Locations. We evaluate the
effect of device locations by varying the network latency
among IoT devices. In order to simulate that, we use the Bit-
coin simulator with three location settings (the Netherlands,
Europe, and World), as in Section 4.1. Since from Evaluation
I, the optimal block size should be less than or equal than 1
MB, the block size is fixed at 500 KB on average. We adopt
a six block generation cycle with the following intervals: 10
minutes, 5 minutes, 1 minute, 30 seconds, 10 seconds, and
5 seconds. We fix the number of IoT devices to 250, where
18 of them are miners. Experiment results are presented in
Table 3.
Network bandwidth, security. For all location setups,
in each block generation interval setting, average network
traffic per device and number of generated genuine blocks
are highly correlated. Particularly, only 1 minute or longer
block generation intervals comply with the bound for the
the network bandwidth metric (the average network traffic
4
Block Block. Total Stale Genuine Stale 90% Avg Thrghpt
Size Gen. Blocks Blocks Blocks Rate Prop. Traffic (TX/s)
Intrvl(s) Delay(s) (Kbps)
10m 10.8 0.43 10.4 3% 360 276 69.3
5m 18.8 0.9 17.9 8.83% 755 723 119.5
10 MB 1m 45.6 16 26.93 35.07% 2162 21215 197.5
30s 51.2 26.6 24.6 47.99% 2412 49520 164.1
10s 57.7 41.2 16.5 71.38% 2560 151046 110.2
5s 64.2 48.2 16 75.00% 2665 273777 107.1
10m 10.2 0.26 9.9 2.6% 168 134 33.1
5m 19.9 1 18.9 5.3% 180 288 63
5 MB 1m 67.3 12.1 55.2 17.99% 1888 8718 184
30s 73.4 26.8 46.6 36.52% 2105 28528 155.5
10s 84 56.5 27.5 67.18% 2472 100255 92
5s 91.4 68.5 22.9 74.91% 2512 190671 76.4
10m 12.3 0 12.3 0% 31 26 8.2
5m 22.3 0 22.3 0% 32 53 14.9
1 MB 1m 92.4 3.4 89 3.71% 37 438 59.3
30s 165.9 8.5 157.4 5.15% 818 3243 104.9
10s 219.6 94.1 125.5 42.86% 1812 30259 83.7
5s 232.5 128.7 103.8 55.37% 2183 69059 69.2
10m 9.6 0 9.6 0% 15 13 3.2
5m 18.6 0 18.6 0% 15 26 6.2
500 KB 1m 92.1 1.6 90.5 1.71% 17 136 30.1
30s 165.2 9.2 156 5.56% 18 639 52
10s 346.5 101.4 245.1 29.25% 1665 14762 81.7
5s 350.6 161.1 189.5 45.96% 1972 41378 63.2
10m 9.3 0 9.3 0% 3.2 2 0.6
5m 23 0 23 0% 3.2 5 1.5
100 KB 1m 99 0 99 0% 3.2 27 6.6
30s 186.4 4.4 182 2.35% 3.2 54 12.1
10s 537.3 22.8 514.5 4.25% 3.4 447 34.3
5s 954.5 124.5 830 13.04% 99 7249 55.3
10m 11 0 11 0% 1.6 1 0.4
5m 18.6 0 18.6 0% 1.6 2 0.6
50 KB 1m 96.3 0 96.3 0% 1.6 14 3.2
30s 187.0 0.7 186.3 0.35% 1.6 28 6.2
10s 562.0 10.2 551.8 1.82% 1.7 84 18.4
5s 1120.4 43.4 1077 3.87% 1.8 931 35.9
10m 10.3 0 10.3 0% 0.4 0.3 0.1
5m 21.6 0 21.6 0% 0.4 0.7 0.2
10 KB 1m 101 0 101 0% 0.4 3.5 0.7
30s 193.3 0 193.3 0% 0.4 7 1.3
10s 598.6 0 598.6 0% 0.4 21 4
5s 1166.3 19.9 1146.4 1.71% 0.4 42 7.6
Table 2: Evaluation I: Block sizes and block generation
intervals
should be less than 250 Kbps) for all location settings.
Hence, a 1 minute block generation interval is the most
suitable according to the security metric bound, since it has
the highest number of genuine blocks. With those, every
locations setup shows a similar behavior.
Scalability, decentralization, efficiency. For any setup
that we tried the outcome with shortest block propagation
delays, lowest stale block rates, and highest transaction
throughputs is the Netherlands setup. For example, with 1
minute block generation interval, a PoW blockchain using
the Netherlands setup achieves a throughput of 30.1 per
second and complies with the efficiency bound (stale block
rate is 1.71%) and decentralization bound (90% block prop-
agation time is 17 seconds). Whereas, in Europe and World
settings, the block generation interval needs to be at least
5 minutes to satisfy the same bounds. With those, both the
Europe and World setups can only achieve a throughput of
5 transaction per second.
Findings: blockchains containing IoT devices that are
geographically close to each other achieve higher throughput
with low stale block rates.
Block Sce. Total Stale Genuine Stale Mean Avg Thrghpt
Gen. Blocks Blocks Blocks Rate Delay Traffic (TX/s)
Intrvl(s) (s) (Kbps)
N 9.6 0 9.6 0% 7 13 3.2
10m E 9.9 0 9.9 0% 16 13 3.3
W 9.9 0 9.9 0% 20 13 3.3
N 18.6 0 18.6 0% 6 26 6.2
5m E 16.4 0 16.5 0% 13 27 5.5
W 15.5 0 15.5 0% 17 27 5.2
N 92.1 1.6 90.5 1.71% 17 136 30.1
1m E 93.6 4.8 88.8 5.14% 18 140 29.6
W 96.5 7.9 88.6 8.22% 20 140 29.5
N 165.2 9.2 156 5.56% 18 639 52
30s E 170.5 21.9 148.6 12.87% 38 527 49.5
W 169.5 23.9 145.6 14.11% 52 592 48.5
N 346.6 101.4 245.2 29.25% 314 14762 81.7
10s E 314 104.6 209.4 33.31% 355 15237 69.8
W 331 136.8 194.2 41.34% 392 16777 64.7
N 350.7 161.2 189.5 45.96% 815 41378 63.2
5s E 301.2 156 145.2 51.80% 918 43931 48.4
W 303.3 161.1 142.2 53.12% 1000 45021 47.4
Table 3: Evaluation II: Device Locations
No of Block Total Stale Genuine Stale 90% Avg Thrghpt
Miners/ Gen. Blocks Blocks Blocks Rate Delay Traffic (TX/s)
Total Intrvl(s) (s) (Kbps)
6/83 3m 29.9 0 29.9 0% 7 44 9.9
12/166 1.5m 76.7 1.3 75.4 1.9% 8 88 25.1
18/250 1m 92.1 1.6 90.5 1.71% 17 136 30.1
36/500 30s 177.7 15.6 162.1 8.8% 41 1168 54
54/750 20s 237.2 32.9 204.3 13.87% 147 3485 68.1
72/1000 15s 216.5 39.4 177.1 18.2% 291 5791 59
90/1250 12s 212 47.5 164.5 22.43% 498 8265 54.8
Table 4: Evaluation III: Number of IoT Devices - Experi-
ment (A): Fixed difficulty setting
4.2.3. Evaluation III: Number of IoT devices. We evalu-
ate the effect of varying the number of IoT devices with two
experiment types: experiment (A): we fix the PoW difficulty;
experiment (B): we fix block generation interval. Each setup
is run for 100 minutes. In both types we vary the number
of IoT devices from 83 to 1250 and assumed a fixed block
size of 500 KB. In PoW blockchains, the block generation
interval depends on the ratio of the difficulty of the PoW
puzzle over the total mining power of the system [6]. Hence,
with the PoW difficulty fixed, we vary the block generation
intervals inversely proportionally to the number of miners.
On the other hand, with a fixed block generation interval
of 1 minute, the difficulty of the PoW puzzle is varied
proportionally to number of miners (the difficulty of the
PoW puzzle is α for 6 miners and 15α for 90 miners).
Experiment (A). Results are in Table 4.
Metrics. Having more IoT devices with shorter block
generation intervals leads to generate more blocks, leading
to an increase in throughput and average network traffic per
device. That causes extensive bandwidth consumption that
generates long block propagation delays, which leads to high
stale block rates. Hence, experimental variations containing
83, 166 and 250 devices satisfy the efficiency, network
bandwidth, and decentralization bounds. When it comes
to scalability and security bounds, scenario containing 250
devices is the optimal setups as it produces more genuine
blocks, and achieves the highest throughput and scales to
more devices.
5
No of Total PoW Stale Genuine Stale 90% Avg Thrghpt
Miners/ Blocks Puzzle Blocks Blocks Rate Delay Traffic (TX/s)
Total Difficulty (s) (Kbps)
6/83 96.1 α 0,8 95.3 0.85% 13 135.76 31.7
12/166 96.3 2α 1.8 94.5 1.19% 14 133.37 31.1
18/250 92.1 3α 1.6 90.5 1.71% 17 136 30.1
36/500 93.03 6α 3.99 89.04 4.29% 26 122.99 32.86
54/750 93.41 9α 4.49 88.92 4.8% 28 102.03 29.64
72/1000 93.03 12α 4.42 88.61 4.75% 28 102.99 29.53
90/1250 92.77 15α 4.98 87.78 5.36% 39 107.01 29.26
Table 5: Evaluation III: Number of IoT Devices - Experi-
ment (B): Fixed interval setting
Experiment (B). Results are in Table 5.
Metrics. In all the experimental variations, 90% block
propagation times are less than 1 minute block generation in-
terval, thus satisfying the decentralization bound. Similarly,
average network traffic per device is less than 250 Kbps, sat-
isfying the network bandwidth bounds for all experimental
variations. However, only experimental variations containing
83, 166 and 250 devices satisfy the efficiency bound with
low stale block rates. Among them, experiment containing
250 devices is the optimal setup according to the security
and scalability bounds, as it achieves the highest throughput
and scales to more devices.
Findings: PoW blockchains containing few hundreds
of IoT devices achieve higher transaction throughput; the
optimal number of IoT devices as blockchain peers is around
250.
4.3. Sweet-spot Guidelines
After Evaluations I,II and III, we can conclude that PoW
blockchains containing few hundreds of IoT devices in close
geographical proximity achieve the highest performance.
Therefore, in order to design a blockchain architecture for
IoT, we propose to deploy multiple PoW blockchains as
sub-blockchains for IoT, organized according to pools of
IoT devices. We adopt the following guidelines, referred to
as sweet-spot:
• Sub-blockchains should contain few hundreds of IoT
devices.
• Sub-blockchains should contain IoT devices that are
geographically close and frequently communicating with
each other.
• Block size and block generation intervals should be set
to ensure low stale block rates, and high decentralization and
scattering of mining power.
• Blocks smaller than or equal to 1 MB should be used.
• Block generation interval should be as short as possi-
ble.
In the next section, we design the architecture of Hybrid-
IoT, based on the sweet spot guidelines, by leveraging on
multiple PoW sub-blockchains.
5. Hybrid-IoT: Hybrid Blockchain Architec-
ture for IoT
Hybrid-IoT consists of multiple PoW sub-blockchains
that achieve distributed consensus among IoT devices that
are peers on the blockchain. Sub-blockchains are generated
according to the sweet-spot guidelines defined in Section
4.3. In order to connect the sub-blockchains, Hybrid-IoT
uses a BFT inter-connector framework (e.g., Polkadot and
Cosmos) that guarantees inter-blockchain transactions.
System execution. The transaction flow in Hybrid-IoT
is as follows: transactions on the PoW sub-blockchains are
processed and included in blocks that are added to their
respective sub-blockchain upon PoW consensus; when a
transaction among two distinct sub-blockchains happens,
that is picked by the BFT inter-connector framework; the
BFT inter-connector framework checks the transaction cor-
rectness and authenticity; after a positive response, the
BFT inter-connector framework transfers the transaction
to the target sub-blockchain’s transaction pools that hold
unprocessed transactions; last, the transaction is processed
and included in a newly generated block in the respective
sub-blockchain, upon PoW consensus. The reasons for the
choice of a BFT inter-connector framework lies in the
intrinsic capability of BFT consensus protocols to achieve
high throughput with a low number of peers.12 Hence, that
should allow to connect few sub-blockchains with an ad-
equate throughput for inter-blockchain transactions. More-
over, by maintaining low latency in the transmission of inter-
blockchain transactions, the BFT inter-connector framework
allows the connection of a new sub-blockchain without
deferring application execution. An example of Hybrid-IoT
architecture containing two sub-blockchains is shown in
Figure 1.
Consensus participation. Blockchains can be catego-
rized into two groups subject to the type of peer access
control: permissioned and permissionless blockchains [18].
In permissionless blockchains, all peers can take part in the
consensus, whereas in permissioned blockchains, only pre-
defined peers can take part in the consensus process. Hybrid-
IoT is a permissioned blockchain system. This is particularly
important since the sub-blockchains are based on PoW and
the nature of IoT devices can easily lead to malicious cases
of majority attack [19]. Indeed, specialized mining hardware
could be easily masked as an IoT device and gain enough
block mining power to control the PoW blockchain.13
Security. While the permissioned nature of Hybrid-IoT
can mitigate the risk of longer blockchain attacks [18], IoT is
still prone to those, since device capture and device cloning
attacks are not a rare occurrence [20]. Usually that would
be mitigated by the difficulty of the PoW puzzle. Indeed,
in PoW blockchains, for a fixed block generation interval,
the difficulty of the PoW puzzle is set proportionally to the
total mining power [6]. While the Hybrid-IoT PoW sub-
blockchains would have PoW puzzles with low difficulty
(there could be only a relatively small number of IoT devices
12For example, Tendermint protocol used by Cosmos network is able
to process thousands of transactions per second [7], whereas PoW sub-
blockchains are able to process few dozens of transactions according to
our evaluations presented in Section 4.
13In the example case of Bitcoin, Raspberry Pi has 0.2 MH/s mining
power, whereas a specialized mining device AntMiner S has 14 TH/s
mining power.
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Figure 1: Hybrid-IoT
that mine), by keeping a high block generation rate, security
vulnerabilities can be prevented (see Section 7).
Anomaly resilience. An important issue to consider is
the so called blockchain anomaly, presented in [21]: "a long
enough delay on the delivery of messages could lead to
having the miners to seemingly agree separately on different
branches containing more than k blocks each, for any k∈N".
While this is theoretically possible, in practice, in a decen-
tralized blockchain, like Bitcoin, it has never materialized
in more than few blocks for many years.14 Hence, in order
to prevent the anomaly in Hybrid-IoT, we adopt the same
degree of decentralization and scattering of mining power
as in Bitcoin. That is assured by the sweet-spot guidelines
and it can be further reinforced by the findings in [16].
Remediations. Unlike specialized PoW mining hard-
wares for cryptocurrencies, such as ASICs and GPUs, IoT
devices have limited hardware resources and they are widely
energy-constrained devices [22]. As such, IoT devices do
not have enough hardware or energy resources to solve very
complex PoW puzzles.15 In Hybrid-IoT, the difficulty of the
PoW puzzle is set according to the hardware constraints of
IoT devices. Therefore, IoT devices can still perform their
application specific tasks, such as data processing, while
concurrently continue to mine blocks.
Roles of IoT devices. IoT devices have heterogeneous
capabilities, and their roles should reflect their capabilities.
Therefore, in Hybrid-IoT, we define three different roles for
IoT devices as peers on the blockchain: full peer roles; light
peer roles; and outsider roles.
• Full peer role. IoT devices that have enough capac-
ity and computing power to perform complex operations,
like a Raspberry Pi 3, take the full peer role. They have
high resources and run full-fledged operating systems like
Raspbian. Hence, as peers on the blockchain, they mine
blocks and take part in the consensus process in the PoW
sub-blockchains. In addition to that, full peer devices act
as gateway devices to connect set of light peer devices to
the blockchain network, referred as full peer device subnet.
Hence, blocks formed by a full peer device contain its own
transactions and transactions sent by its device subnet. The
14We crawled orphan blocks through all of the Bitcoin orphan blocks
presented in blockchain.info/orphaned-blocks.
15As of late 2017, it would require more than 1000 years for a Raspberry
Pi to mine a single block in Bitcoin.
number of light peer devices in the full peers’ device subnet
is set according to its mining power to guarantee fair block
generation rates.
• Light peer role. IoT devices that have limited capa-
bilities and computing power, such as Arduino Yun, take
the light peer role. They have basic operating systems
like Alpine Linux, and can connect and participate in the
blockchain by performing simple tasks, such as sending
transactions. Light peer devices send transactions to the
blockchain transaction pool and to the full peer that acts
as a gateway. This allows all the full peers to be aware of
all the transactions in the sub-blockchain. This acts as a
double-check in case a full peer is subject to a malicious
attack.
• Outsider role. IoT devices that have very limited
capabilities by being able only to act as basic sensors, take
the outsider role. They are not peers on the blockchain, but
they can connect to full peers for further data fusion (such
as data aggregation). Raw data generated by an outsider is
not stored the blockchain to prevent data overload.
6. Performance Evaluation
In Hybrid-IoT, as per Section 5, light peer devices send
transactions to full peer devices, and those will include
them in the newly generated blocks. Hence, full peers need
to process an heavy transaction loads. Therefore, the first
performance test for Hybrid-IoT is a stress test, in which,
set of light peers repeatedly sends transactions to full peers
(see Section 6.1). Then, we shift the focus to the different
sized PoW sub-blockchains, where full peers take part in
the consensus process. Sub-blockchains can be generated
with different number of full peers, which affects the time
required to achieve consensus and the way in which the
full peer manages its resources. Hence, the second type of
performance test is done by varying sub-blockchain sizes
and measuring the time needed to achieve consensus and
the full peers’ resource usage (see Section 6.2).
6.1. Performance Evaluation I: Stress test
We design a DDoS attack simulation for the stress test:
20 light peers take the role of attackers; a full peer takes the
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role of victim; the attack is conducted for 45 minutes. All
the peers are are virtualized with LXC (Linux Containers)16
containers and have the following configurations:
• Full peer: Ubuntu 14.04 (Trusty) O.S; 512 MB RAM
memory, 10% of one Intel Core i7 2.70 GHz CPU; 5
mbit/s ingress and egress network interface limit; bitcoind
version 14.02 Bitcoin protocol’s full node. We measure
CPU utilization, memory usage, and Ethernet activity with
nmon.17
• Light peer: Alpine Linux 3.6.0 O.S; 128 MB RAM
memory, 2% of one Intel Core i7 2.70 GHz CPU, 1 mbit/s
ingress and egress network interface limit; Java SE; JRE 8
update 131 environment; Bitcoin protocol’s thin client model
developed with bitcoinj library. We monitor CPU usage,
memory usage, and Ethernet activity with RRDtool.18
We use Bitcoin regtest19 (regression test) network to execute
the stress test. The DDOS attack is executed as follows: a
number of attackers, max 20, generate a load of identical
and valid transactions of ca 225 bytes at varying frequency
(from ca 2tx/s to ca 9tx/s); once the victim receives the load
it checks the transactions validity add them to the transaction
pool. A load of 108960 transactions was generated with an
average of 5448 transactions per attacker. For the sake of
brevity, in the figures, we show measurements only for the
first 15 minutes and only for the CPU component (the other
components have very similar trends).
Victim results. Figure 2(b)20 shows the CPU usage of
the victim: 90% of its CPU is exhausted by processing
the attackers’ load; a similar measurement and graph is
observed for its Ethernet activity; memory usage is steady
around 150 MBs. The victim manages to receive and process
over 40 transactions per second from 20 attackers. We can
conclude that the victim successfully manages to perform
its blockchain duties without crashing or halting under the
heavy load from the attack (here heavy is attributed to the
fact that the attackers’ resources are exhausted).
Attacker results. Figure 2(a) shows the CPU usage of
one of the attackers: nearly 100% of the attacker’s CPU is
exhausted (it is capable of processing ca 300 bit/s); there is
an increase in memory usage from 99 MB (before starting
to attack) to 124 MB (during attack), utilizing all of its
memory. When one light peer takes the role of attacker, it
manages a maximum of 9 transactions per second without
crashing. This should help to characterize the capabilities of
a light peer to generate transaction loads, regardless of the
DDoS simulation performed.
16linuxcontainers.org
17nmon.sourceforge.net
18oss.oetiker.ch/rrdtool
19bitcoin.org/en/glossary/regression-test-mode
20Legend for Figure 2; user: avg CPU utilization for Bitcoin client;
system: avg CPU utilization for kernel mode; wait: avg CPU utilization
for I/O wait mode.
Metrics 20 peers 40 peers 100 peers 200 peers
Avg CPU usage 6.7% 5.2% 2.8% 2.1%
Avg Memory usage 115 MB 109 MB 109.1 MB 108.7 MB
Avg Ethernet traffic 7.9 KB/s 6.2 KB/s 3.6 KB/s 1.6 KB/s
Avg Ethernet packets 9.4/s 8.5/s 5/s 3.6/s
Table 6: Perf Eva II: Performance Statistics
6.2. Performance evaluation II: Sub-blockchain
size
In order to measure the sensitivity to sub-blockchain
sizes, we design four sub-blockchain emulation scenarios
(Emulation I,II,III and IV) by varying the number of full
peers in the sub-blockchains. In Emulation I the number of
full peers is 20, in Emulation II 40, in Emulation III 100,
and in Emulation IV 200. Peers are connected to each other
in a round-robin way. All the full peers are virtualized with
LXC (Linux Containers)21 containers on an IBM Power 8
server and have the following configurations:
• Full peer: Ubuntu 14.04 (Trusty) O.S.; 512 MB RAM
memory; 5% of a single Power8 3.5 GHz CPU; 5 mbit/s
ingress and egress network interface limit; bitcoind version
14.02 Bitcoin protocol’s full node. We measure CPU uti-
lization, memory usage, and Ethernet activity (traffic and
packets) with nmon.22
We use Bitcoin regtest (regression test) network to exe-
cute the emulations. The emulations are executed as follows:
in each emulation we submit 11.000 identical transactions
(225 bytes) to the network with one full peer; one peer sub-
mits to the remaining full peers the 5 blocks with 1 minute
block generation interval; the full peers achieve consensus
on the submitted blocks. We measure resources utilization at
the last peer of the round-robin from the moment at which
the submitting peer proposes the first block of the five, till
the moment in which all the five blocks are recorded on the
local blockchain copy of the last round-robin peer (we refer
this as the consensus cycle in the rest of the paper). We note
that we do not employ light peers to generate loads. This
is justified by the need of measuring consensus with heavy
transactions loads. All measurements are in Table 6 or in
the text below.
Results. We observe that the consensus cycle is longer
with sub-blockchains with more full peers as block and
transaction propagation takes longer. We show in Table 6,
that on average, emulation scenarios with more full peers
use less resources. This is because, with sub-blockchains
with more full peers, resource utilization is averaged over
longer consensus cycles.
7. Security Evaluation
Despite having low difficulty puzzles, sub-blockchains
can prevent security vulnerabilities with high block genera-
tion, as noted in Section 5. We evaluate this by simulating a
21linuxcontainers.org
22nmon.sourceforge.net
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Figure 2: CPU utilization of devices in Performance Evaluation I
set of scenarios in which six sub-blockchain setups are com-
pared. This is done with the help of the Bitcoin simulator (as
in Section 4.3) and by measuring their total work. Total work
is defined as the multiplication of the number of genuine
blocks by the PoW puzzle difficulty. The sub-blockchains
are generated according to sweet-spot guidelines contain
subgroups of IoT devices that are geographically close to
each other. Hence, we generate the following scenarios:
• Scenario I: 83 peers of which 6 full peers.
• Scenario II: 166 peers of which 12 full peers.
• Scenario III: 250 peers of which 18 full peers.
The scenarios above are generated using the Netherlands
setup. We also generate 3 more scenarios using the World
setup to have a baseline:
• Scenario IV: 500 peers of which 36 full peers.
• Scenario V: 1.000 peers of which 72 full peers.
• Scenario VI: 2.000 peers of which 144 full peers.
We vary the difficulty of the PoW puzzle proportionally
to the number of full peers (see Table 7). We also assume
that all the peers have the same resources. In order to
evaluate the sensitivity to block size we vary the block size
with values 100KB, 500KB and 1MB. We configure every
scenario with the shortest block generation interval, in order
to be compliant with the bounds of the metrics defined in
Section 3. We present the results in Table 7.
Results. As expected, Scenarios I, II and III are able
to comply with the bounds of blockchain-IoT integration
metrics with shorter block generation intervals than Sce-
narios IV, V, and VI, and thus they produce more genuine
blocks. This trend is more prominent with small block size
settings. In fact, with 100 KB blocks, total work of Scenario
I sub-blockchain is more than the total work of Scenario
VI sub-blockchain, the latter with a twenty-four times more
difficult PoW puzzles than the former. Whereas, with 1 MB
blocks, due to a simulated limited bandwidth (inherited from
the need to replicate low bandwidth IoT), block generation
intervals are longer. With 1 MB block size, total work
of Scenario II sub-blockchain is more than the Scenario
IV sub-blockchain, the latter with six times more difficult
Block Simulated PoW Puzzle Block Genuine Stale Total
Size Scenario Difficulty Interval Blocks Rate PoW
Scenario I α 30s 198.6 1.2% 198.6α
Scenario II 2α 35s 162.6 1.56% 325.2 α
100 KB Scenario III 3α 40s 133.2 1.7% 299.6α
Scenario IV 6α 6m 15.2 1.49% 91α
Scenario V 12α 7m 13.6 1.99% 163α
Scenario VI 24α 10m 9.2 1.9% 178α
Scenario I α 50s 98 1.95% 98α
Scenario II 2α 55s 74.1 1.2% 148.2α
500 KB Scenario III 3α 1m 90.5 1.71% 271α
Scenario IV 6α 10m 10.4 1.98% 62α
Scenario V 12α 11m 9.7 1.89% 117α
Scenario VI 24α 12m 8.4 1.96% 203α
Scenario I α 150s 37.5 1.3% 37.5α
Scenario II 2α 165s 34.6 1.2% 69.2 α
1 MB Scenario III 3α 3m 26.6 0% 79.8α
Scenario IV 6α 10m 10.5 0.5% 63α
Scenario V 12α 12m 8.3 0% 99α
Scenario VI 24α 13m 5.9 1.8% 141α
Table 7: Security Experiments’ Results
PoW puzzles than the former. Hence, we observe that with
smaller blocks we can generate sub-blockchains with less
full peers without sacrificing security. We finally observe
that, even with low difficulty PoW puzzles, sub-blockchains
generated according to the sweet-spot guidelines are able to
have more or comparable total work than sub-blockchains
with high difficulty PoW puzzles that do not adhere to those
guidelines (the Netherlands scenarios have more work with
easier PoW puzzles than World scenarios with more difficult
PoW puzzles).
8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel hybrid blockchain
architecture for IoT, referred to as Hybrid-IoT. In Hybrid-
IoT, subgroups of IoT devices become peers on PoW sub-
blockchains, connected with a BFT inter-connector frame-
work. In this paper, we analyze the design of the PoW sub-
blockchains. The performance evaluation proves the validity
of the PoW sub-blockchain design under the sweet-spot
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guidelines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the sweet-spot
guidelines also prevent security vulnerabilities.
Future work includes: analyze and stress data volumes
in Hybrid-IoT; identify a BFT inter-connector framework
to test the current design; prove the correctness of Hybrid-
IoT design with properly done security proofs; implement a
crash fault tolerant algorithm for the light peers, to address
the issue of a full peer subnet losing the connection to light
peers in its subnet (due to several reasons, malicious or
not); analyzing the energy footprint of PoW Hybrid-IoT;
and design a PoW algorithm that is IoT energy friendly.
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